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Prevention in public policy is much discussed but rarely theorized. This article begins 
with a theoretical framework for reflecting on the political economy of prevention in 
advanced capitalist economies that integrates the analysis of preventive policies 
across the social, environmental and economic domains. The next two sections survey 
prevention initiatives in social policy and climate change policy respectively. These 
mainly focus on the last three decades and are based mainly on UK evidence. The 
article then considers the relative absence of prevention in contemporary economic 
policy and management: today’s neo-liberal economic and political order powerfully 
constrains preventive public policy. The final section outlines an alternative social 
political economy that prioritizess preventive and precautionary policy making. 
 
 
 
 
 
The case for preventive public policy is ever present in large welfare states. Debates 
over health, crime, early years interventions and many other areas of social policy 
stress the advantages of prevention over coping, cure, compensation or confinement. 
This emphasis has been motivated by a combination of normative and economic 
reasons: it is better for human well-being to prevent harm than to deal with its 
consequences. The current era of austerity only strengthens the case for prevention, 
while at the same time constraining its funding. 
Yet there is also agreement that prevention rarely succeeds. Despite the shift in 
discourse over the last two decades from social compensation to social investment, 
Western – and especially European welfare – states remain predominantly 
‘downstream’ operations, addressing a variety of needs and harms that could in theory 
be prevented. This article explores why this is so and concludes that prevention 
initiatives are continually derailed by powerful ideological, interest-based and 
institutional forces. 
To understand this combination of salience and impotence, I argue that the scope 
of prevention must be broadened to embrace not just social policy but environmental 
and economic policy too. This is a distinctive feature of a recent report by the New 
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Economics Foundation,
1
 which argues that these three spheres are inextricably and 
increasingly interdependent, and must be addressed together to plan for a sustainable 
future. In particular, social and environmental policy cannot be addressed 
independently of economic policy.  
We shall see that each of these three domains of prevention poses quite different 
questions and deploys distinct conceptual frameworks. While the prevention 
framework is explicitly applied in social and environmental policy, it is much less 
prominent in thinking on economic policy. Yet it can be shown that effective 
prevention in both the social and environmental domains requires a major 
reorientation of the current economic paradigm. This necessitates a political economy 
approach that embraces all three domains. I contend that the obstacles to equitable 
and sustainable preventive policies are located in the economy, sustained by 
neoliberal ideology, and reinforced by the private interests and institutions that benefit 
from both of these. 
This article begins with a theoretical framework for reflecting on the political 
economy of prevention in advanced capitalist economies. The next two sections 
survey prevention initiatives in social and climate change policy in turn, mainly 
focusing on the last three decades and based mainly on UK evidence. Then the 
relative absence of prevention in contemporary economic policy and management is 
considered: today’s neoliberal economic and political order powerfully constrains 
preventive public policy. I conclude that it is not possible to develop robust social and 
environmental prevention in a political economy driven by short-term, non-
generalizable interests. In the final section I outline an alternative social political 
economy that prioritizes preventive and precautionary policy making.  
 
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The dictionary defines prevention as stopping something (usually unpleasant) from 
happening. This definition is rather crude – it is all or nothing; either threat/risk X is 
stopped or it is not. A more useful alternative definition of prevention is ‘to reduce the 
probability of a risk occurring’.2 I shall take this to mean public policies designed to 
reduce the risks of significant harms befalling a population, following the centrality of 
the concept of harm in our earlier work on a theory of human need.
3
 
 
Coote,
4
 drawing on health policy analysis, distinguishes three levels of public 
interventions: 
1. Upstream interventions: to prevent harm before it occurs, usually focusing on 
whole populations and systems; 
2. Midstream interventions: to mitigate the effects of harm that has already 
happened, usually targeted at groups or areas considered ‘at risk’; and 
3. Downstream interventions: to cope with the consequences of harm that has not 
been – or cannot be – avoided.  
In particular, upstream interventions do not address the immediate causes of harm but 
rather the ‘causes of the causes’.5 They are concerned with ‘the adaptation of 
                                                          
1
 Coote 2012. 
2
 Cf. Holzmann and Jorgensen 2001. 
3
 Doyal and Gough 1991. 
4
 Coote 2012, 9. 
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circumstances to individual need, rather than the adaptation of individuals to 
circumstances’; such interventions target prevailing economic and social structures, 
rather than adapting individuals to them.
6
 
 
Theories of Prevention 
Though there are numerous theorizations of prevention in specific policy domains 
(some of which are surveyed below), theories of prevention per se are notable by their 
absence. In two articles Richard Freeman undertakes ‘a self-conscious attempt to 
theorize a domain of activity which is often left undertheorized’.7 He argues that 
prevention is a product of modernity, which is bound up with the welfare state and the 
authority of professional and scientific expertise. Prevention policy is built on several 
basic foundations. I will concentrate on two: (1) scientific understandings of cause 
and effect and the possibility of prediction and (2) the capacity for controlled 
government intervention in social life.  
Both of these foundations are contested. Contending theories about the social 
world have different notions of causality, conflicting value bases and different 
conceptions of the role of public policy. There is contention in numerous areas of 
social policy: between structural and individual approaches, between contextual and 
rational actor models, between medical and social explanations, etc. Alongside these 
differences, there is the sheer empirical challenge of identifying causality when 
modelling complex chains and changing social contexts. Perhaps Foucault’s critique 
of the relationship between knowledge and power (and his allied notion of 
surveillance) constitutes the most powerful relativist rejection of the possibility of 
prevention.
8
 To answer these critiques I consider each of Freeman’s foundations in 
turn. 
 
Scientific Understanding: Ontology and Epistemology 
Here I draw on earlier work with Len Doyal on theorizing human needs.
9
 This project 
encountered similar doubts that human needs can be coherently and consensually 
defined, emanating from diverse sources including liberalism, phenomenology and 
post-modernism. Our response to these doubts is that, cutting across cultural and 
value differences, there is an irreducible notion of ‘serious harm’, defined as 
‘fundamental disablement in the pursuit of one’s vision of the good’. The avoidance 
of harm constitutes the most basic human interest.
10
 This enables us to define basic 
human needs as universal preconditions for avoiding serious harm, which we identify 
as physical health and autonomy. This approach shares some features with Sen’s 
concept of ‘functionings’ and more with Nussbaum’s ‘central human functional 
capabilities’.11 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5
 Marmot 2005, 1101. 
6
 Freeman 1992, 39; Freeman 1999. 
7
 Freeman 1999, 233. 
8
 Foucault 1980; Freeman 1992. 
9
 Doyal and Gough 1991. 
10
 Doyal and Gough 1991, 55. 
11
 Gough 2003, forthcoming. 
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This does not take us very far in rebutting relativist critiques of the justification 
for public (including preventive) policies. If we accept that there are certain universal 
harms and needs, we also know that the satisfiers of these needs are almost always 
variable and very often context specific. Both I and Nussbaum argue that a conceptual 
bridge can be built across this gap. In our case it is by identifying ‘universal satisfier 
characteristics’ – properties of goods, services, activities and relationships that 
enhance physical health and human autonomy in all cultures. In this way, ‘scientific 
understanding of cause and effect’ plays a role in developing public policies, 
including preventive policies.  
However, such codified scientific knowledge is never enough. All effective 
policies to avoid harm and to develop appropriate need satisfiers must also draw on 
the experientially grounded knowledge of people in their everyday lives and contexts. 
Thus effective policy making requires a dual strategy that brings to bear both the 
codified knowledge of experts and the experiential knowledge of those whose basic 
needs and daily lives are under consideration. Fostering such a challenging process 
requires radically enhanced participation, empowerment and new forms of 
deliberative dialogue. Only by utilizing such a dual strategy can effective, upstream 
preventive programmes be devised and implemented.
12
  
 
Intervention Capacity: Political Economy  
Turning to the second of Freeman’s preconditions, what factors explain the 
prominence, role, nature and effectiveness of preventive strategies adopted by 
particular governments in particular policy areas at particular times? Is not 
government capacity for controlled intervention always limited? If anything, is it not 
weakening in the modern globalized world?  
To answer this question I build on historical and comparative welfare state 
scholarship over the past four decades. This literature has identified five factors or 
drivers of social policy development in the West over the last century: the ‘five I’s’ of 
industrial capitalism, interests, institutions, ideas/ideologies and international 
influences.
13
 Though developed to explain social policies, I believe this framework 
can also be applied to the contemporary emergence of environmental policies.
14
 In 
this article I will focus on ideas, interests and institutions in order to understand the 
development and pattern of modern preventive public policies. 
 
Ideas and ideologies 
Ideas and ideologies – clusters of views on the nature of the world and normative 
beliefs about what governments can and should do – play a central role in shaping the 
goals, scope and nature of preventive strategies. The ongoing disputes between 
libertarian, liberal and social democratic perspectives on the harms of unconstrained 
markets and the role of the state are clearly relevant to views about the desirability 
and extent of prevention policy. Similarly, the form of prevention varies according to 
ideological persuasion. Youth crime can either be prevented by fortifying public 
buildings introducing metal detectors in schools and child curfews or by 
                                                          
12
 The case for the dual strategy is made at greater length in Doyal and Gough (1991, chapter 15). I 
return to these issues in the final section. 
13
 Gough 2008; Gough and Therborn 2010. 
14
 Gough 2013a. 
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neighbourhood development programmes and other holistic programmes that promote 
child well-being.
15
 Likewise, obesity can either be reduced by stomach stapling 
operations or by regulating sectors of the food industry or numerous interventions in 
the middle. Harm from prospective climate change can be reduced by cutting 
emissions or by adapting infrastructures or behaviours. Real-world preventive 
strategies are highly contested, and are shaped by dominant paradigms in society. 
 
Institutions 
Public policies, including preventive public policies, are shaped by institutions. These 
include the nature of political systems, their form of political representation, the 
administrative bureaucracies of modern states and how interest groups are integrated 
into the policy-making process. Three examples will be discussed. First, 
representative democracy favours short-term policy making following electoral 
cycles, militating against longer-term preventive strategies. Secondly, the welfare 
states of the Western world have built up powerful ministries that seek to protect their 
policy areas and block overarching preventive initiatives. Thirdly, these in turn 
bequeath policy legacies, commitments and path dependencies: welfare states pre-
empt the application of resources to prevention due to the ‘double fiscal burden’ that 
such investment strategies impose.  
 
Interests 
Behind ideas often lurk different organized interests, including medical, pedagogical, 
and accountancy-based professions created by and dominant in welfare states. A 
plethora of NGOs has also emerged to propound various forms of preventive policy 
that is notably oriented to targeted midstream interventions. The influence of trades 
unions has diminished in Western countries since the 1970s, but the structural power 
and ‘voice’ of corporate and financial interests has clearly grown. In social policy, 
two business lobbies are important: sectors that supply inputs to state services (from 
producing drugs to running care homes and prisons) and sectors whose products harm 
health or well-being that social policies try to ameliorate. Both wield considerable 
power (alongside the professions) to inhibit or shape prevention policy. In climate 
change policy, industrial and commercial interests play an important role in opposing 
or supporting mitigation programmes. 
The above constitutes conceptual elements with which to confront and rebut 
current scepticism about the knowledge and capacities of modern states to undertake 
preventive measures, some of which are addressed in the final section. The need to 
establish a moral and technical foundation for preventive policy has gained new 
urgency from the environmental crisis – especially from the threat to the ability of our 
planet to sustain human life as a result of escalating climate change. This is the 
ultimate ‘serious harm’ that is calling forth new, unprecedented preventive efforts. So 
far all have proved inadequate, but this does not invalidate their overriding moral 
justification. This is the central reason why preventive policy must now take a broad 
perspective across the three spheres of society, environment and economy. The above 
framework provides a checklist to which I will refer when seeking to explain 
‘government capacity for controlled intervention in social life’. 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 France, Freiberg, and Homel 2010; Hayward 2007. 
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SOCIAL POLICY AND PREVENTION 
Social policy is a major source of contemporary debates and policy innovations 
concerning prevention, and has fostered a wide range of studies and research. I shall 
here briefly survey health, crime and early years intervention, mainly drawing on 
examples and evidence from the UK over the past three decades. The distinction 
between upstream, midstream and downstream interventions, noted earlier, has its 
origins in medicine and health. It has since been adopted and adapted across other 
areas of social policy, as illustrated in Table 1. Despite numerous policy commitments 
and initiatives, the finding is that – with some notable exceptions – preventive 
interventions have been marginalized and, when pursued, focus almost exclusively on 
midstream or downstream measures. 
 
Table 1 Levels of Prevention 
 Upstream Midstream Downstream 
Social risk 
management
16
  
Prevention: reduce 
the probability of a 
downstream risk 
Mitigation: reduce 
the potential impact 
of a future 
downstream risk 
Coping: relieve the 
impact of the risk 
once it has 
occurred 
Health
17
  Prevent the onset 
of undesirable 
states 
Early disease 
detection and 
interventions 
Minimise impact of 
disease 
Crime
18
 Reduce crime 
events by 
modifying the 
physical and/or 
social environment 
Identify at-risk 
populations and 
potential criminals 
and address the 
causal risk factors 
Stop criminals 
committing more 
crime, for example 
via imprisonment 
Social work
19
  Prevent the 
emergence of a 
problem 
Early identification 
of problem; 
amelioration and 
containment of 
serious problems 
Avoid further harm 
to client 
 
Health 
 
The founding idea of the British National Health Service (NHS) was preventive, but 
in practice it has been utterly dominated by treatment. Pressure by the Health 
Education Council, chief medical officer and various reviews such as the Wanless 
reports of 2002 and 2004 have continually urged preventive initiatives alongside the 
NHS, for example restraining smoking and alcohol.
20
 And as the cost of the 
treatment-oriented NHS has mounted, there has been growing interest in the cost-
                                                          
16
 Holzmann and Jorgensen 2001, 541–2. 
17
 National Public Health Partnership 2006; OECD 2009. 
18
 Brantingham and Faust 1976. 
19
 Hardiker, Exton, and Barker 1991. 
20
 Allsop and Freeman 1993. 
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containment potential of effective healthpromotion
21
 The New Labour government 
developed a more coherent preventive health strategy, beginning with the 
pathbreaking 1998 Green Paper Our Healthier Nation, and put in place some 
initiatives to implement it. However, this approach was again soon sidelined when 
Prime Minister Blair announced his 2000 Health Plan to greatly expand expenditure 
on the treatment-oriented NHS. And many of the New Labour preventive initiatives 
have not survived the change of government. 
Two linked debates have dominated the entire period: between different 
ideologies and between interventions targeted at individuals or social structures. First, 
the very idea of preventing ill health could be seen as a Fabian one, entailing 
proactive government and a degree of ‘social engineering’.22 The New Right or 
neoliberal arguments concerning individual liberty and consumer sovereignty gained 
prominence in the late 1970s and have not relinquished that position. The ‘nanny 
state’ slogan has wormed its way into the national psyche.23 Yet this counter-ideology 
has not removed prevention from the political agenda; rather, it has redefined it in 
terms of altering individual behaviour and ‘lifestyle choices’.  
The second debate has been between interventions targeted either at individuals or 
social structures. Those arguing for more structural, upstream interventions have kept 
up a continual presence, from the 1978 World Health Organization Alma Ata 
declaration and the 1980 Black Report to the 1998 Acheson Report and the 2010 
Marmot Review on health inequalities in England. The most radical focus is on the 
‘pathogenic nature of modern social structures’ and the current ‘obesogenic 
environment’ of energy-dense food, motorized transport and sedentary lifestyles.24 
The Marmot Report proposes a preventive strategy that includes fair employment and 
good work, a healthy standard of living for all, and healthy and sustainable places and 
communities. But these proposals have gained little traction. Rather, the dominant 
strand of preventive intervention has been biomedical (for example, statins), targeted 
early years interventions (for example, immunization, nutrition during pregnancy, 
parenting classes) and health education and lifestyle change (for example, smoking 
cessation).  
Can the framework presented earlier explain both the subaltern role of prevention 
in health policy and the dominance of individualist interventions? I briefly consider 
some of the arguments. 
 
Ideological and epistemological 
It is difficult to gather clear evidence of the effectiveness of primary preventive health 
measures, particularly those that accrue in the medium or long term. Both biomedical 
science and economics (the dominant epistemic community in the social sciences) 
favour targeting individual bodies and behaviours. The search is for individual 
pathogens rather than the social context of disease.
25
 Since the 1970s, the role of 
                                                          
21
 Knapp, McDaid, and Parsonage (2011) provide a recent example. 
22
 Freeman 1992, 40. 
23
 Coote 2004. 
24
 Davis 1979; Sustainable Development Commission 2010. 
25
 Davis 1979. 
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medical sociology has been sidelined, and with it alternative, contextual methods to 
evaluate different policies.
26
 
 
Institutions 
The institutional structures of health and the governance structures of modern 
capitalist societies weaken the scope for structurally oriented preventive health. 
Powerfully organized medical professions around the NHS reproduce a political 
constituency that advocates and favours curative therapies. In addition, all modern 
medical care systems indirectly, through their costs, weaken health promotion and 
prevention.
27
 Managerial reforms in the NHS, coupled with progressive privatization 
of some functions, have generated new systems of payment by results that – by 
favouring outputs that are easily measurable and attributable in the short term – 
further weaken the capacity to deliver preventive health measures.
28
  
 
Interests 
Two powerful business lobbies are outside government. The first, representing drugs 
and medical suppliers, campaigns for preventive measures that represent profitable 
niches in which to supply goods and services.
29
 A second lobby, representing 
businesses that produce potentially health-harming products, campaigns assiduously 
to prevent prevention, as with the current arrangements for ‘self-regulation’ in the 
food and drinks industry. A final sector with a powerful impact on prevention is the 
media, which favour dramatic curative events and health ‘crises’ of various sorts, and 
give very low prominence to public health (no illness or crisis = no story).  
Thus, notwithstanding the ethical and economic arguments for upstream 
prevention, the dominant discourses – backed by powerful interests and institutions – 
have blocked any significant switch in priorities. New Labour did increase the share 
of preventive health spending during its term in power, but it was dwarfed by the 
overall NHS budget and retains a low share of 3.6 per cent of total health 
expenditure.
30
  
 
Crime 
 
Crime is another policy area in which preventive discourses figure greatly. It is also 
one with quite well-established links between ideologies, theories and policy 
recommendations (see Table 1). Much of the twentieth century was dominated by 
sociological theories of crime as a threat to social cohesion that merits ‘just desserts’ 
punishment. From the 1960s onwards, this approach was coupled with dispositional 
theories exploring why certain groups committed crimes and research on identifying 
at-risk groups and developing midstream forms of prevention. In the 1960s and 
1970s, a critical criminology perspective emerged that briefly situated crime in the 
                                                          
26
 Asthana and Halliday 2006; Davis 1979; Mays, Pope, and Popay 2005. 
27
 Evans and Stoddart 1994. 
28
 Coote 2004. 
29
 See Foote and Blewett (2003) on the USA. 
30
 OECD 2009. 
 
 
9 
 
context of capitalist inequality and the state justice system and suggested more radical 
upstream approaches.  
The 1980s saw a rather clear paradigm shift toward a neoclassical criminology 
and rational choice theory,
31
 which focused on the ‘rationality’ of certain forms of 
crime, notably theft and burglary, for certain groups. The preventive policy derived 
from this was ‘situational crime prevention’ (for example, fortifying buildings and 
properties, CCTV surveillance, internal locking and metal detectors in schools, etc.). 
Such ‘upstream’ prevention was concerned with modifying the built environment and 
gave little attention to the social environment; at the same time, downstream 
prevention was boosted via a continually rising rate of imprisonment. The current 
Coalition government is also developing new ways of privatizing prevention, 
instituting a payment-by-results policy – here focused on outcomes rather than 
outputs – to incentivize ‘offender management’. This policy provides a range of 
providers with incentives to encourage the rehabilitation of offenders. It requires a 
large administrative apparatus, measurable and attributable outcome indicators, 
systems to track individuals through programmes, and monitoring of unforeseen 
consequences,
32
 all of which can encourage ‘gaming’ by private contractors. 
The model of ‘technical prevention’ endorses focused, short-term, cost-effective 
programmes, consistent with individualist rational choice theory. It can also be 
explained in terms of dominant interests and institutions. Criminal justice bodies and 
the police play a greater role compared with social work and probation professions: 
for example, the new ‘Secured by Design’ policy is administered by the Association 
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO). Furthermore, the model provides large new 
profitable opportunities to a burgeoning security industry and multinationals like 
G4S: an interconnected and self-perpetuating dynamic is emerging that involves 
ACPO, private security companies and a public standards culture.
33
 Ideas, interests 
and institutions act together to reinforce a limited and flawed model of crime 
prevention. 
 
Early Years 
 
The idea of intervening in the rearing and education of pre-school children became 
dominant in the 1990s.
34
 In particular, New Labour after 1997 developed a range of 
initiatives such as the Every Child Matters Green Paper, the Children’s Act of 2004, 
Sure Start, the Children’s Fund and On Track. These measures were linked to the 
preventive health strategies noted above. Their motivation was to prevent (or at least 
stem the worsening of) a series of social problems including truanting, youth crime, 
poor school achievement and employment prospects, and ‘welfare dependency’. The 
rationale was both value based, seeking to move away from the predominantly 
punitive strategies of the 1980s and early 1990s, and economic, seeking to forestall 
rising costs to welfare and penal services. 
Risk Factor Analysis, imported from the United States, became an important tool 
to identify the targets for such secondary intervention. It led to the relative neglect of 
                                                          
31
 Hayward 2007; Kautt and Pease 2012. 
32
 Puttick 2012. 
33
 Minton and Aked 2013. 
34
 Smith 1999. 
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the sociological life course approach, the dangers of stigmatization, and the role of 
structural factors and transactions between individuals and contexts.
35
 This ‘empiricist 
psychometric’ approach36 applies a fortiori to the recent reliance on neurological 
findings on brain growth championed in the Coalition government’s Early 
Intervention Report.
37
 Critics are also concerned that too much emphasis is now being 
placed on policing families and ‘parenting’ – a neologism reflecting a new and 
explicit arena of policy intervention. 
The report Backing the Future
38
 advocates an alternative ‘universal and holistic’ 
preventive system for the early years. It draws on cross-national research 
demonstrating the effectiveness of Scandinavian social and family services in 
reducing a wide range of social problems, from young people who are not employed 
or in education to teenage births, and from crime to mental health. These combine 
extensive universal benefits with selective programmes targeted at families and 
individuals in need. While this is not a cheap option, the report shows that the costs of 
not preventing are higher. Indeed it advocates social bonds, redeemable over a ten-
year period, to finance social and family services without tax costs.
39
 However, the 
Scandinavian preventive approach stands in stark contrast to the dominant strategy in 
the UK, which remains targeted on individuals rather than structures. To reverse this 
would require a shift in welfare regime that conflicts with major interests and 
institutions that are currently pressing for a radical reduction in the scope of the 
British welfare state.
40
  
 
Summary 
Discourses of prevention have proliferated across social policy – within health, crime 
and early years intervention – over the last three decades, a period coinciding with the 
maturation of welfare states and continual attempts to manage long-term cost 
pressures. This situation of ‘growth to limits’ is now overlaid by unprecedented short-
term cuts to manage fiscal crises brought about by the 2008 crash. Though the 
economic environment strengthens the efficiency case for prevention, in practice 
policy initiatives have been derailed by powerful ideological, interest-based and 
institutional forces. For ideological reasons (and because it has been in the interest of 
dominant players and institutions), in all three fields of social policy, such preventive 
policy that has occurred has been downstream or midstreamwhere ‘primary’ 
prevention strategies have been developed, they have adopted a technical rather than 
social form of intervention.  
 
                                                          
35
 France, Freiberg, and Homel 2010. 
36
 Taylor-Gooby and Zinn 2006. 
37
 Allen 2011; cf. Bristow 2011. 
38
 Aked et al. 2009. 
39
 See also Mulgan, Aylott, and Reeder 2011. 
40
 Taylor-Gooby 2013. 
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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: PREVENTING CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
The domain of environmental policy is quite different. It is potentially enormous, 
covering the pollution of air, water and land; species extinction; threats to global 
resources, including oil, water and food supplies; and much more. I will concentrate 
only on the threat of climate change, which according to the Garnaut Report poses ‘a 
truly complex and diabolical policy problem’41 for reasons that can be linked back to 
Freeman’s twin foundations of preventive public policy.  
The first scientific understanding of cause and effects and the possibility of 
prediction is very problematic given, inter alia (1) the complexity of the global 
climate system, (2) the inherent problems of predicting the effects of a unique, rapid, 
one-off shift in the parameters and (3) the complexity of the causal chain linking 
global warming to human welfare. The second (governmental) capacity for controlled 
intervention is also remarkably problematic. Climate change is a global phenomenon, 
yet no global agency has the necessary responsibilities and capacities to address the 
problem. It is also an intergenerational issue that poses threats into the very long term, 
far longer than the scope of any existing public policies. Climate change is also 
cumulative, so that short-term, high-cost measures are necessary to forestall vaguer, 
but potentially enormous, future costs. Thus one would expect that national 
governments would have little motivation or capacity to implement serious preventive 
strategies. 
Yet despite these formidable obstacles, there are two areas of success. First, the 
global scientific consensus is growing stronger over time, martialled by the 
formidable reports of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
42
 This 
consensus is challenged by powerful ‘climate denial’ interests, yet, contrary to 
expectations, this sceptical current has made little headway in terms of public opinion 
in the West, with the exception of three outlier countries: the United States, Canada 
and Australia. Most surveys show public opinion in Western countries to be 
ambivalent – wishing to protect the earth’s environment but unwilling to pay a 
significant price to do so. There has been some increase in climate change scepticism 
in the UK since 2005, and overall levels of concern about the issue have fallen, as 
have risk perceptions.
43
 But the great majority of world citizens believes that climate 
change is happening and that it is caused by human activity. 
Secondly, national and regional prevention policies have been developed.
 44
 The 
EU has put in place the world’s most ambitious cap-and-trade programme, the 
Emissions Trading System. And the UK Climate Change Act of 2008 is remarkably 
radical: a commitment to cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 80 per cent by 
2050, with tough legally binding intermediate five-year targets, and a statutory body 
(the Climate Change Committee) charged with monitoring progress. This amounts to 
an unprecedented preventive strategy. It even led, under New Labour, to the first 
national plan since the 1960s – the UK Low Carbon Transition Plan. Rather than 
planning for growth in outputs, it planned for cuts in carbon emissions and GHGs, but 
it contained all the features of state planning for prevention: goals, targets, costing of 
                                                          
41
 Garnaut 2008; Steffen 2011. 
42
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007. 
43
 Gough 2013b. 
44
 Jacobs 2013. 
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alternative scenarios, sectoral breakdowns, timelines, policy proposals and incentive 
systems. (The Coalition government has since abandoned this implementation 
framework).  
However, in terms of global results the record is poor if not disastrous. The only 
binding global agreement, the 1992 Kyoto Protocol, is quite inadequate; since its 
creation, global emissions have ‘more than doubled’.45 The issue of global 
governance is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I consider why, at the national 
level, certain progress in mitigation/prevention has been achieved (thus far), despite 
the scientific and governance obstacles noted above. 
 
Ideas and Ideology 
The scientific consensus on climate change is solid and has increased over time. 
However, there is an empirical link between extreme neoliberal beliefs and denial of 
climate change. This has been stated most pithily by Martin Wolf:  
To admit that a free economy generates a vast global external cost is to admit 
that the large-scale government regulation so often proposed by hated 
environmentalists is justified. For many libertarians or classical liberals, the 
very idea is unsupportable. It is far easier to deny the relevance of the science.
 
46 
This has contributed in the United States (and Australia) to fierce ‘climate wars’: the 
‘issue framing’ of climate change has generated strongly polarized positions – it has 
become a crucial ‘ideological marker’.47 Thus the hegemony of neoliberal ideas poses 
an ever-present threat to climate mitigation.  
 
Interests 
Commercial interests in coal, oil and energy-intensive ndustries, especially in the 
United States, are funding vigorous public ‘information’ and lobbying campaigns to 
denigrate climate change science. Against this, a ‘green’ agenda is advanced, from 
above and below. On the one hand, there has been an ‘efflorescence of non-state 
activism’: protest groups, countercultural movements, the green party, environmental 
social movements, transition towns, etc.
48
 On the other hand, elite interest in reform 
can shift. Sectors of business understand the opportunities in green products and 
processes. Political elites understand the social costs of unplanned growth. These 
reformist elites will conflict with representatives of ‘carboniferous capitalism’ and 
libertarian politicians, and outcomes will partly depend on this balance of power. 
 
Institutions 
As a relatively recent policy domain, climate change policy making has required the 
construction of new ministries, such as the UK Department of Energy and Climate 
Change in 2008. Several factors have facilitated this institutional emergence: unlike 
social policy, there was no prior fiscal burden to be financed, and the core 
programmes of climate change mitigation have required little public expenditure so 
far. Moreover, there is a substantial prospective role for the private sector in 
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developing green industries.
49
 There is cross-national evidence that institutional 
patterns of interest representation affect the adoption of climate mitigation policies. 
Corporatist (rather than pluralist) political systems enable leading EU countries, 
notably Germany, and the EU itself to advance an alternative strategy of green growth 
that is based on aggressive carbon constraints and green technology.
50
 However, there 
is evidence that the post-2008 economic depression has lowered concern for climate 
change and strengthened pressures for short-term remedies that may undermine 
national mitigation action in the future. 
To summarize, the threat of climate change calls for unprecedented preventive 
strategies to reduce GHG emissions in rich countries, but estimating causal effects 
and developing the capacity to intervene are daunting. Yet we find ambitious 
mitigation targets and programmes in place in certain countries, which are related to 
the configuration of their ideological, interest-based and institutional features. This 
returns us to the economy, current economic models and styles of economic 
management. 
 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND MANAGEMENT 
 
Preventive economic policy is rarely discussed as such. An online search of 
‘prevention’ and ‘economic policy’ reveals a large number of studies related to the 
influence of economic policy and economic performance on the effectiveness of 
prevention in numerous other domains: famine, obesity and health, inequality, group 
conflicts, peace building, disaster prevention, etc. But there arerelatively few studies 
on prevention as a goal within economic policy and management – the major 
exception proposals to prevent a repeat of the 2008 financial crash and banking 
bailouts.  
This inattention to preventive measures reflects the domination of economics by 
ideologies – in the sense of combined normative and explanatory views of the world. 
Economic policy and management are riven by the clash between the competing 
paradigms of neoclassicism and Keynesianism (or some form of ‘Keynes-plus’). 
Neoclassicism or neoliberalism displaced Keynesianism in the late 1970s and remains 
the dominant economic paradigm across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development and much of the world. The extraordinary financial crisis has done 
little to dent its hegemony. Thus I begin by exploring the paradigm clash and 
ideological transition around 1980 in some detail, before briefly noting the underlying 
role played by interests and institutions in this shift.
51
  
 
Ideologies 
Keynesianism dominated until the mid-1970s, and founded what could be regarded as 
a precautionary, preventive style of economic management. Fiscal and monetary 
policy was to be used to maintain aggregate demand and near-full employment, with 
resulting social and economic benefits. The automatic stabilizers of tax and welfare 
spending could be regarded as primary preventive economic mechanisms. However, 
anomalies within this system began to accumulate, notably the combination of 
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stagnation and inflation, which posed great challenges to the Keynesian paradigm – 
first to its instruments and techniques, and ultimately to its goals. After a period of 
both ‘puzzling’ and ‘powering’ it was displaced, initially in the English-speaking 
world, with what I will call neoliberalism.
52
 
It is useful to distinguish between two ‘counter-revolutions’ here: Hayekism and 
neo-classical economics, both of which have profound implications for Freeman’s 
twin bases of preventive economic management. Hayek’s53 philosophical foundations 
– of markets as catallaxy and society as a spontaneous order – deny the rationale and 
capacity for any but the most minimal forms of preventive policy. They hold that 
society or its representatives cannot conceive of the causal connections between 
policies and outcomes in a scientific way. Furthermore, should the state try to 
intervene in markets to prevent harm, this would be coercive, since the constraints on 
market actors’ opportunities would be intentional.54 
The second, neo-classical counter-revolution abolished the distinction between 
uncertainty and risk, abandoned the idea of a distinct macroeconomic method and 
advanced the belief that markets are powerfully self-stabilizing. ‘Rarely in history’, 
writes Skidelsky, ‘can such powerful minds have devoted themselves to such strange 
ideas’.55 With their triumph, government intervention in numerous areas of the 
economy was rolled back: ‘contracting out’ and quasi-markets spread in social policy, 
cap-and-trade and market incentives spread in climate mitigation and privatization 
and deregulation ruled in economic policy. Skidelsky and many others have 
demonstrated the role of this model in bringing about the 2008 crisis. 
Where did this leave preventive economic policy – and, notably, primary 
prevention? In a series of influential writings, Majone
56
 argued that a new form of 
policy making, the ‘regulatory state’, emerged to complement the shift toward a 
privatized economy. Its goal was to rectify market failures, notably the abuse of 
monopoly power and excessive externalities. This might be thought to offer the 
prospect of a new form of preventive economic management. However, Majone 
himself argued that the sole normative justification for such intervention is, and 
should be, efficiency: to improve positive-sum outputs for the economy as a whole. 
This required regulation by expert agencies – the Ofgems, Ofwats and Ofcoms of 
today’s world. Yet such a regulatory structure is not conducive to joined-up thinking 
in economic management. Nor can efficiency objectives be separated in practice from 
equity or sustainability goals. For example, the UK policy of obliging energy 
companies to reduce emissions and increase renewables hurts lower-income 
households the most, since raising energy charges to pay for them is highly 
regressive. 
Following the 2008 crisis, the case for a reinvented Keynesianism – or rather of a 
new paradigm that embraces but moves beyond Keynes – is re-emerging. 
Recognizing the radical uncertainty of the future in all economic management 
provides the starting point. According to Keynes, capitalism, as the engine of 
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accumulation, exacerbates this radical uncertainty. From this it follows that 
government should pursue precautionary policies. Such preventive economic policies 
would include taming finance via substantial restructuring of financial markets, active 
macroeconomic management and the socialization of considerable sectors of 
investment. For example, the investment aspect of social policy would be 
emphasized, and new ways of ‘valuing what matters’ established.57 Adair Turner, past 
Chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority, argues that governments should 
seek to maximize stability rather than growth, and even proposes making explicit 
distinctions between good and harmful (or ‘socially useless’) economic activity.58  
However, the solid reality remains, in the words of Colin Crouch, ‘the strange 
non-death of neo-liberalism’.59 To understand the persistence of such anti-
precautionary economic policies, we must move beyond the domain of ideas and 
ideologies and recognize the role of interests, institutions and power that sustains 
them.  
 
Interests 
Neoliberalism serves the interests of powerful capitalist agents, and in turn 
strengthens their power. Crouch argues that it serves the interests of giant 
corporations, which are ‘more potent than states or markets’. This power is based on 
both structure (their ability to engage in ‘regime shopping’ in a globalizing world 
economy) and agency (their capacity and willingness to spend vast amounts on 
lobbying and political funding). The end result is no less than the ‘capture’ of 
governments by corporations, a process begun in the United States. For other 
scholars
60
 it is the financial sector which drives neoliberal policies and benefits most 
from them. As industry declines and is outsourced from the West, most notably in the 
UK, capitalism becomes financialized with numerous consequences. As a result, 
instability increased, culminating in the 2008 crisis. But this only strengthened 
financial capital, as its structural position became more critical to national economic 
survival.
61
 
 
Institutions 
Thus governments, starting with the American and British, become more beholden to 
these private and sectional interests and ideas. Indeed, governments and capital 
become more entwined, and the ability of democracy to temper this is eroded as 
‘winner-takes-all’ politics takes over.62 Streeck63 even argues that economic elites 
have become so rich that their interests become divorced from those of the survival of 
the system. There are no longer any collective constraints on personal greed, and all 
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claims of social need are sidelined – beginning most notably in liberal market 
economies dominated by financial interests, such as the UK.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
If this general argument is true, then the obstacles to equitable and sustainable social 
and environmental policies (including longer-term preventive policies) are profound. 
They are located in the economy, sustained by neoliberal ideology, and reinforced by 
the private interests and institutions that benefit from them. 
In different areas of social policy, prevention discourse flourishes, mainly fostered 
by cost concerns of large welfare states that are now facing big cuts. However, most 
policy is directed at altering individual and family behaviours, rather than larger 
social structures. This is the result of dominant ideas that undermine the rational case 
for coherent longer-term social interventions – ideas that are in turn maintained by 
powerful interests and institutional biases. 
In environmental policy, specifically climate change mitigation, at first we find a 
contrasting and paradoxical picture. Despite the manifold knowledge and capacity 
problems in mitigating future global warming at the global level, a reasonably 
coherent primary prevention strategy is emerging in the EU, including in the UK. 
However, the cross-national evidence suggests this is likely to be more effectively 
implemented (if at all) in economies with stronger traditions of state intervention.
64
 
In economic policy and management, the global dominance of neoliberal ideas, 
economic models and values blocks the emergence of an alternative strategy for an 
equitable and sustainable social economy. Preventive action in the economy, society 
and the environment can make little headway in an atmosphere that is hostile to bold 
public initiatives. This hegemonic climate is supported by, and reinforces the power 
of, dominant corporate and financial interests. 
Thus the current economic model hinders the necessary public regulatory, fiscal 
and mobilizing initiatives that are essential for a co-ordinated social-environmental-
economic preventive strategy of the sort advocated by the New Economics 
Foundation at the start of this article. Within social policy, for example, ‘contracting 
out’ spawns and subsidizes a growing network of private providers and a new form of 
private-interest government. Within climate change mitigation, it has seen off 
effective carbon taxes and new public investment in ecosystem maintenance. 
Growing cross-national evidence supports this conclusion, but qualifies it in 
important ways. Goodin and colleagues have demonstrated in great detail that social 
democratic forms of capitalism, typified in their study by the Netherlands, have 
outperformed US capitalism across all major socio-economic outcomes – poverty, 
inequality and social integration; the German form of capitalism has achieved a 
respectable second place. Their more recent work shows that the same pattern holds 
when looking at a healthy work-life balance, which serves both social and 
environmental prevention goals.
65
 Comparative research on environmental regulation 
and climate mitigation shows that the leaders in the developed world are the co-
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ordinated economies such as Germany and social democratic welfare states such as 
the Nordics.
66
 
The conclusion is that there are potential synergies between radical preventive 
social and environmental policy, which can be realized in more co-ordinated forms of 
capitalism. Integrated prevention is possible and cross-national research offers 
evidence of its realization in certain capitalist contexts. This more hopeful conclusion 
is developed in the final section by returning to some of the theoretical issues raised at 
the start of the article.  
 
TOWARD AN ALTERNATIVE SOCIAL ECONOMY AND INTEGRATED 
PREVENTION 
 
An alternative, preventive social-economic model needs to address, inter alia, three 
issues: the shibboleth of ‘consumer choice’, how to reach consensus on just and 
sustainable forms of preventive intervention, and the preconditions for integrated 
policy making. This returns us to the normative, scientific and governance issues 
raised in the introduction.  
 
Sustainable Needs versus Consumer Sovereignty 
Hayek and neo-classical economics together helped cement the prime position of 
consumer sovereignty in economics and as a central, taken-for-granted, normative 
stance in policy making. We have seen how this has inhibited various strands of 
preventive public policy (with some hard-fought exceptions, such as smoking 
cessation). Yet all serious studies by scholars in political science, law and behavioural 
sciences demonstrate that consumer preferences are endogenous to socio-economic 
systems. Our wants are shaped by structures, interest groups, and private and public 
institutions. Thus to proclaim respect for consumer choice as the taken-for-granted 
foundation of preventive policy is to respect the current factors and forces shaping 
preferences as either optimal or unchangeable.  
This notion is rejected by scholars from a wide range of positions: ‘(In the face of 
current levels of obesity) it is quite fantastic to suggest that everyone is choosing the 
optimum diet, or the diet that is preferable to what might be produced with third-party 
guidance’.67 ‘Any welfare approach based on the presumption that individuals are 
always the best judges of their own interest falls at the first hurdle: many people 
neither understand nor accept the conclusions of the science of climate change’.68 
Thus it is essential to qualify the pursuit of want-regarding principles with ideal-
regarding principles, to use Brian Barry’s terms.69 I have already argued that human 
need provides just such an alternative measure of value. Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum proclaim capabilities and functionings.
70
 There are differences between 
these concepts, but these are less important than the opportunity all offer to 
operationalize ideal-regarding principles. In developing these alternative value 
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measures, disciplines other than economics will play a powerful role, one that has 
been displaced in recent decades. Economics is by far the most dominant ‘epistemic 
community’ in the modern world, and economists such as Stiglitz, Turner and 
Skidelsky recognize the harm this is doing. To develop more structural, primary 
forms of preventive policy, the full range of social (and historical) sciences needs to 
play a greater public role. 
 
Codified and Local Knowledge 
In determining the evidence for making preventive interventions, I have argued that 
two sorts of knowledge must be tapped. First, there is the best available codified 
knowledge, including scientific/technical knowledge of causal relationships between 
harms/need satisfaction and other factors, and comparative anthropological 
knowledge about practices across cultures and sub-cultures, states and political 
systems in the contemporary world. Second is the experientially grounded knowledge 
of people. If upstream interventions are to be negotiated, all groups must have the 
ability to participate in devising need satisfiers and to contribute to policy making:  
Preventing harm is arguably most effective when it involves change from the 
bottom up: people and organizations becoming more resilient: building up their 
own immune systems, both literally and metaphorically, so that they become less 
susceptible to harm; changing attitudes and capabilities so that they are better able 
to withstand harm by taking positive actions themselves.
71
  
Thus any rational and effective attempt to resolve disputes over ways to improve 
the satisfaction of human needs, including preventive action, must bring to bear both 
the codified knowledge of experts and the experiential knowledge of those whose 
basic needs and daily life are under consideration. It ‘requires a dual strategy of 
policy formation which values compromise, provided that it does not extend to the 
general character of basic human needs and rights’.72 This dual strategy calls for new 
forms of participatory processes and deliberative dialogue, which are already much 
explored and piloted in numerous areas of life.  
It is not inconsistent to extol the virtues of participation while being extremely 
critical of existing representative democracy, as the Nef report recognizes: ‘While the 
processes of preventing harm may well be more effective if they are participative … 
the politics of prevention offers a formidable challenge to democracy, perhaps 
especially where the environment is concerned’. Quite apart from the domination by 
powerful lobbies, the decline of value-based political parties results in a 
representative democracy built on aggregating preferences, as expressed in ‘median 
voter’ theories. Moreover, there is an inherent conflict between electoral cycles and 
the long time frame of environmental pressures, resource planning and investment.  
 
A Political Economy for Preventive Policy Making 
The Brundtland Report famously defined sustainable development as ‘development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’.73 Achieving this requires certain procedural and 
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material preconditions.
74
 The procedural preconditions refer to the ability of a nation 
(which I shall take as the relevant economic unit at this stage) to define basic needs 
and appropriate need satisfiers in a rational way and to prioritize the need satisfactions 
of different groups, including future generations. These preconditions entail that the 
composition of output in an economy becomes as much an object of policy as its size 
and distribution. Following Baumol
75
 and Turner, we should foster a principled 
debate on the distinctions between productive, unproductive and destructive outputs 
in the economy. This returns us to much earlier discussions of productive and 
unproductive labour, luxuries and necessities, and inputs essential for reproducing 
people, communities and ecologies. 
Using this framework, I have tried to evaluate the ability of three forms of 
capitalism to achieve these preconditions: neoliberal capitalism, statist capitalism and 
corporatist capitalism.
76
 Of these, corporatist capitalism has the potential to integrate 
market forces with two other methods of co-ordination – state intervention and public 
negotiation. It can, in theory, provide elementary forms of dialogic democracy to 
advance these material preconditions. By contrast, neoliberal capitalism fails to 
achieve the first precondition – to identify sustainable needs. Indeed, true neoliberals 
glory in the fact that there is (and should be) no central debate on, or prioritization of, 
the goals of the economy. By frequently denying the existence or knowability of 
individual and social needs, it cannot or will not challenge consumer demand except 
in isolated cases. Thus needs that are not backed up by relevant knowledge and/or 
purchasing power will go unmet. By deregulating markets to the maximum extent, the 
ability of consumer-citizens to define need satisfiers is also diminished. Democratic 
distortions are numerous and increasing, as financial and corporate power isunleashed 
and freed from democratic restraint. 
Yet the ability of capitalism to meet material preconditions for human well-being 
should not be dismissed. Markets can utilize the dispersed knowledge of millions of 
separate actors to achieve historic improvements in material standards of living. 
However, there is the well-established litany of market failures requiring state 
regulation and intervention; to regulate and redistribute incomes to prevent soaring 
inequality; to protect consumers against the power of commercial lobbies and 
advertisers; and to prevent the degradation of future natural resource stocks via 
regulation of property rights, preservation of stocks of natural capital and fostering of 
longer time horizons. Even in the most deregulated forms of capitalism, governments 
will pursue some of these forms of regulation; but the continual neoliberal pressure is 
to undermine them or roll them back altogether, as the disciples of Ayn Rand now 
demand in America. 
To conclude, Freeman’s presumptions for effective public prevention policy are 
not necessarily out of reach. They can be reconstituted within a more collective, 
precautionary political economy that prioritizes meeting needs and avoiding harm, 
which pursues a dual strategy and fosters dialogic democracy. In so doing, it can draw 
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on the experiences of alternative forms of co-ordinated capitalism, as they still exist 
across Europe and as they emerge across the world.  
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